Summer Takeaways From The Infrastructure War: Fuel, grain, logistics and Crimea

A quarter of Wildberries and a second fuel crisis: the Ukrainian campaign in August

An analysis of available open-source data shows that the intensity of Ukraine’s campaign of air strikes against Russian infrastructure decreased slightly in August compared with July. The number of strikes on targets deep within Russia across key sectors, including oil refineries, fuel infrastructure, industrial facilities and consumer infrastructure, fell to 52 from 68 in July. The intensity of strikes on infrastructure in Crimea and the Sea of Azov also decreased significantly. The number of large-scale attacks, in which several targets were struck simultaneously, also fell. In July, we recorded 11 night-time attacks in which between three and six targets were hit (the most successful was the strike on 24 July, when the ‘Avitek’ plant along with five warehouses were hit), whereas in August there were six (the most successful being the strike on 24 August, when five targets were hit, including an oil storage tank in Yeysk, the Kamensky plant, and three OZON warehouses).

Ukrainian strikes on targets in Russia, January–August 2026

Ukrainian strikes on occupied territories and vessels in the Sea of Azov, June–July 2026

In August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out 20 successful strikes on Russian oil refineries, which have been the main target of the Ukrainian air force over the past two years. Following a brief lull in mid-July, the attacks resumed towards the end of the month: in fact, 16 oil refineries were struck in the two weeks from 23 July to 8 August. As a result, by the end of the first ten days of August, a second wave of the Russian fuel crisis had begun, peaking towards the end of the second ten-day period, according to data compiled by Meduza on petrol availability at filling stations. In the final ten days of August, however, the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck a further seven oil refineries. According to Reuters’ estimates, domestic petrol production in August, combined with imports, covered 85% of demand. Meanwhile, according to data from Rosstat, production of petroleum products in July fell by almost 20% compared with July last year, but rose by 5.6% compared with June 2026, thanks to the completion of maintenance work.

Over the three summer months in which the refinery-strike campaign reached its current intensity, 50 strikes were carried out on refineries (compared with 33 over the first five months of the year). The strategy of repeatedly hitting the same facilities not only prevents their full recovery but also largely negates the point of repair work. In August, the Syzran and Yaroslavl refineries were struck most often (twice each), while over the three summer months as a whole the Syzran refinery was hit four times, and the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI), Bashneft-UNPZ, Tyumen and Moscow refineries were each hit three times. In total, since January 2025 the largest number of Ukrainian strikes has fallen on the Saratov refinery (13), the Ryazan refinery (12), and the Syzran and Afipsky refineries (11 each). The number of attacks on fuel infrastructure facilities fell to five in August, following the record levels of June (25 strikes) and July (23). These included hits on the Sheskharis oil export terminal in Novorossiysk, the Novatek-Ust-Luga complex, and the Tamanneftegaz terminal.

Top 10 Russian refineries hit by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 2025–2026, number of attacks

The intensity of strikes on consumer infrastructure, the second successful Ukrainian campaign, which began in July, remained at the previous month's level. After 20 warehouses were hit in July (mostly belonging to Wildberries), Ukrainian forces struck 21 trade-logistics facilities in August, including four Ozon warehouses, Russia's second-largest online marketplace. Over three days of strikes from 22 to 24 August, the Ukrainian army destroyed more than 6% of the company's total warehouse space, according to calculations by the publication Agency. The area of Wildberries’ warehouse space destroyed in August is comparable to July’s losses (around 1.2 million square metres, according to preliminary estimates). According to calculations by Verstka, by 17 August the company had lost more than 40% of its warehouse space. By the end of the month, losses had likely exceeded 45% of warehouse capacity.

The number of strikes on other industrial facilities in August stayed roughly at July's level (six versus four) and was half the level seen in June (11). The most destructive strikes were the 15 August attack using FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles on the Progress Rocket Space Centre in Samara, Russia's only facility producing Soyuz-2 carrier rockets, which damaged the onboard electronics assembly workshop, and two strikes on the Kamensky plant in Rostov region (on 16 and 24 August), which hit up to six workshops and killed five people.

Another air campaign by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is focused on the blockade of Crimea, the Sea of Azov and the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia since February 2022. Here the intensity of strikes fell substantially, though this appears to be because Ukraine's forces consider part of the campaign's objectives already achieved in the previous month. No new bridges were hit in August (compared with five in July and 24 in June), and the total number of strikes on energy facilities in Crimea and other occupied territories fell by 20%, to 123 in August from 156 in July. Overall, the number of Ukrainian strikes on Crimea fell from 129 to 27, while the number of strikes on Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions rose from seven to almost 80.

Furthermore, since 18 July, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not carried out a single strike on the Kuban–Crimea power bridge, whereas during the first three weeks of July, the corresponding PP-2 ‘Crimea’ interconnection point was struck three times (on 8, 13 and 18 July). However, the restrictions on electricity supply to the peninsula introduced in July remained in place in August and were even tightened. In July, a ‘3 hours on, 3 hours off’ power cut schedule was introduced in northern and southern Crimea, whilst in Sevastopol it was ‘2 hours on, 6 hours off’. On 20 August, a total blackout occurred in a number of Crimean cities, including Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta. By the end of August, according to official figures, the electricity supply in Sevastopol had resumed under the ‘3 hours on, 3 hours off’ schedule. The fuel crisis in Crimea, according to media reports, is continuing, but the situation does not appear as critical as it was a month ago. Thus, Crimea is living under a partial, rather than a complete, blockade.

The number of Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea fell sharply: a total of 205 strikes on vessels were recorded in July, compared with just 45 in August. At the same time, the Ukrainian army effectively targeted Russian grain export infrastructure: the strike of 12 August hit three grain terminals in the port of Novorossiysk. Operations at the two largest grain terminals – the Novorossiysk Grain Terminal (NGT) and the Novorossiysk Bakery Products Plant (NBPP) – were halted, and shortly afterwards the KSK terminal ceased operations. Operations at the Taman Grain Terminal Complex (TGTC) have also been suspended. The entire export corridor via the Sea of Azov has been paralysed. The Russian authorities are attempting to organise alternative transport routes, but have had little success. As a result, according to the Rusagrotrans analytical centre, the forecast for wheat exports in August has been reduced to 1.8 million tonnes, which is 2.5 times less than a year ago, as reported by Kommersant.

Ballistics and ‘banderols’: Russia is expanding its arsenal

Whilst Ukraine’s air campaign in August remained at roughly the same level as in July, Russia significantly stepped up its own air war against Ukraine, broadening its range of targets and increasing its strike capability.

Calculations by Re:Russia, based on statistics from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, show that in August Russia may have increased the number of ballistic missile launches, while the number of drones and cruise missiles used fell. At the same time, the Russian army continues to modernise and expand its arsenal of weapons.

According to Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko, the slight decrease in the total number of drone attacks is due to the fact that the proportion of the more expensive, but also more difficult to intercept, Shahed-238 jet drones is growing within their arsenal. The share of intercepted kamikaze drones in August stood at 88%, however, compared with record figures of 92-93% in March-May 2026. The Russians have also modified their drone-attack tactics, striking cities with small waves of drones every 30-60 minutes around the clock, notes the War Translated monitoring channel. The Z-channel ‘Two Majors’ also notes that between 27 and 30 August, a series of air strikes on Kyiv continued almost uninterrupted for four days. According to Ihor Romanenko, a Ukrainian military expert and founder of the ‘Let’s Close Ukraine’s Skies’ foundation, the Russian army has moved beyond night-time attacks and is now launching wave-like assaults on Ukraine using rocket-powered drones in the mornings and conventional drones during the day, in an attempt to break the civilian population’s will to resist.

Number of Russian drones deployed in large-scale strikes against Ukraine, 2025–2026

The main area of air power disparity between Russia and Ukraine lies in cruise missiles and, in particular, ballistic missiles. As we wrote previously (→ Re:Russia: The Third Phase of The Long War), the depletion of Patriot interceptors in Ukraine’s arsenal leaves its critical infrastructure virtually defenceless against Russian ballistic missiles as the winter season approaches. The dramatic drop in interception figures led the Ukrainian Air Force to cease publishing data on the number of Russian missile launches and interceptions from 10 August onwards. Towards the end of the month, however, Ukraine received a new consignment of anti-missile rounds for the Patriot system, after which the Air Force command reported, for the first time in three weeks, that seven ballistic missiles had been shot down on 27 August and five on 1 September, without, however, specifying the total number of missiles launched.

Although statistics on Russian ballistic missile launches are available for only half of August (71 missiles), the daily rate of launches at the start of the month was a record high for the entire war, at 5.8 missiles per day, and was double the average for the first seven months of 2026. As we have previously reported, Russia is ramping up its production of ballistic missiles (→ Re: Russia: The Third Phase of The Long War). In an August interview with RBC-Ukraine, the deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR), Vadym Skibitsky, claimed that the rate of missile production in Russia had increased and remained at 110–120% of the target (and for ‘Zircon’ and ‘Onyx’ missiles, for example, the annual production target had already been met by 3 August). According to GUR data, which is cited by ‘Ukrainska Pravda’, the Russian army is stockpiling missiles and, as of the end of August, held 130 9M723 (Iskander-M) missiles, 50 North Korean KN-23/KN-24/KN-30 missiles, 50 Kinzhal missiles, and 400 S-400 missiles. The outlet also reported that in August Russia began deploying a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh region, comprising six launchers equipped with 120 ballistic missiles.

Launches of Russian ballistic missiles against Ukraine, 2025–2026

Launches of Russian cruise missiles against Ukraine, 2025–2026

In August, 117 cruise missiles were fired at Ukraine, which is two and a half times fewer than in July. Whilst the interception rate rose from 59% to 68%. Although the interception rate remains high, the ramp-up in production of the low-cost ‘Banderol’ drone-like cruise missile poses a threat to Ukraine. It is equipped with a 114 kg fragmentation warhead (four to five times smaller than that of cruise missiles), but is launched not from strategic bombers, but mainly from ‘Orion’ reconnaissance drones, as well as from helicopters. According to some estimates, the ‘Banderol’ costs between €42,000 and €127,000, whilst the production of a single cruise missile costs almost €700,000. This summer, the ‘Banderol’ began to be used extensively for strikes on Odesa and the Odesa region, and in recent weeks it has been used on the eastern and northern regions of Ukraine. Russia is seeking to ramp up production of the ‘Banderol’ from 100–150 to 300–400 per month, according to Zelensky’s adviser Serhiy ‘Flash’ Berekrestnov.

Ports, petrol stations and logistics: three targets of Russian attacks

This summer, following Ukraine’s lead, Russia also launched a series of air campaigns targeting specific elements of Ukraine’s economic and logistical infrastructure. The most successful and economically significant of these is the campaign against Ukraine’s port infrastructure.

The attacks on ports have taken on a massive scale since the end of June. According to reports from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office, 28 civilian vessels were attacked in the ports of Greater Odesa between 20 June and 20 July, whilst for the whole of July, the Ukrainian Ministry of Development recorded 67 attacks on port infrastructure, 35 attacks on vessels in ports and 22 attacks on vessels in the maritime corridor. As a result, Maersk and Kernel, the largest logistics companies serving the Odesa ports, suspended operations there from 22–23 July. In August, attacks on port infrastructure intensified further: the port of Izmail was attacked three times, as was infrastructure used to reroute cargo by land and via the Danube, according to media reports.

The blockade of the ports is a serious blow to Ukrainian grain exports and to the Ukrainian economy as a whole. According to Reuters, grain exports from Ukraine in August fell by two-thirds compared with August last year, and the Ukrainian sector’s total losses for the year are expected to reach $3 billion. As Bloomberg has reported, the ports of Odesa account for around 90% of Ukraine’s grain exports, which in turn account for more than half of the country’s export revenue. Moreover, following the collapse of Ukraine’s heavy industry, the sector’s importance to the economy has grown even further. Evghenia Sleptsova, an expert at Oxford Economics, told the agency that due to the disruption of grain export routes, Ukraine could lose 1.8% of its GDP this year and 2.1% in 2027.

Russia’s campaign to destroy Ukrainian petrol stations has proved far less effective. By early August, strikes had been carried out on nearly 250 stations, according to data from the ACLED project. By 20 August, Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal was already citing a figure of 300 destroyed stations, which accounts for 6% of all petrol stations in the country. In some regions of Ukraine, petrol stations have been completely destroyed. However, according to Ukrainian experts and officials, this campaign has had no impact on military logistics and merely hinders access to fuel in some parts of the country, without creating shortages.

A far more serious threat has come from attacks on logistics infrastructure, which peaked in August. In July the main targets were the sorting and warehouse facilities of Nova Poshta, the leader in Ukrainian logistics; in August, the attacks expanded to include the infrastructure of other companies (in particular, Roshen’s warehouses), as well as the grocery chains Fora, Varus, Silpo, NOVUS and the home-improvement chain Epicentre. According to statements by Ukraine’s Agriculture Minister, Taras Vysotskyi, by 28 August, around 90% of the space used for grocery logistics networks had been destroyed. He acknowledged that this could lead to a reduction in the range of products available in shops, but not to food shortages; in other words, the delivery logistics will be restructured.

Social and economic consequences: interim findings

If we compare the two opposing campaigns in the infrastructure war between Russia and Ukraine, it can be said that the Ukrainian campaign against Russian infrastructure is having a more significant social impact. From the very outset of the conflict, the Ukrainian population has faced bombing and missile strikes and, in a sense, has adapted to the hardships and damage caused by the war. In Russia, by contrast, the population had been shielded from such hardships for several years, whilst the Russian authorities had successfully maintained an atmosphere of peacetime life. That way of life has now been seriously undermined by the fuel crisis and the partial destruction of consumer infrastructure, which is clearly affecting the social mood of Russians.

From an economic point of view, the situation is the opposite. The blows to oil refining and consumer infrastructure are likely to trigger inflationary effects, worsen industrial performance and create additional pressure on the economy due to a prolonged period of high interest rates and the accumulation of non-performing loans in the banking system (→ Re:Russia: The Ripple Effects of the Petrol Crisis). However, taken as a whole, this damage to the economy will be smaller, in relative terms, than the consequences of the grain export crisis for Ukraine. Moreover, the losses in exports will increase the burden of financial support for Ukraine on EU countries, which may soon become a problem, given how high this burden already is.

But the main issue and the primary threat posed by this mutual infrastructure war is the anticipated Russian campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during the autumn and winter months. ‘In accordance with the instructions received, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have begun preparations to launch large-scale strikes against Ukraine’s energy facilities’, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported on its official Telegram channel on 30 August. This campaign, through which the Kremlin hopes to ‘freeze out’ Ukraine, is one of Putin’s main strategies amid setbacks in advancing the ground offensive (→ Re:Russia: The Third Phase of the Long War)

Given the shortage of air defence resources, particularly Patriot interceptor missiles, Ukraine has few options for defending itself against this threat (→ Re:Russia: Infrastructure Rather Than Territory). In addition to restructuring and diversifying its energy networks, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could step up efforts to identify and destroy Russian launch systems. For example, the Iskander-M ballistic missile system has a range of 500 km, and military analyst Rob Lee notes that Ukrainian drones are quite capable of driving these systems out of the border zone, which would reduce the scale of the Russian missile threat. Military analyst Clément Molin writes that, in August, the Ukrainian Armed Forces extended the strike range of their medium-range missiles deeper into Russian territory, which ‘may open the way to the targeting of Iskander and S-400 missile launchers close to the border in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod oblast which are used to target Kyiv’. However, this would, of course, only partially weaken the overall power of the Russian campaign. A more effective scenario would be one in which Ukraine is able to pose comparable threats to Russian energy infrastructure during the winter using its own arsenal of long-range missiles.